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INTRODUCTION
In the twenty-first century, the textbooks on international
law, it is submitted, will all include a chapter on fighting corrup-
tion across the border. In the following, the first section will be
devoted to pointing out why it seems worthwhile to fight corrup-
tion at all. It will then be explained more fully in the second
section why that fight should be carried across state frontiers.
Upon establishing the transnational character of the problem,
an outline of an international solution will follow in the third
section. In conclusion, a short word will be added on how the
cross-border fight against corruption will relate to future interna-
tional law in general.
I. THE NEED TO FIGHT CORRUPTION
The tumbling of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989 pre-
cipitated the spread of democracy and free market economy
throughout Eastern Europe, including the whole of what was
then the Soviet Union. Less identifiable by a specific date but
equally fundamental proved a shift of economic policy from uto-
pian central planning to vigorous free marketeering in many
countries of the Third World. Even the First World of well-set-
tled industrialized states started moving again and entered a new
phase of deregulation and privatization.
Times of transition are times of corruption. To some extent
one will therefore simply have to wait for the new structures to
become firmly established. In the East of Europe, however, the
process of consolidation could easily be overtaken by a gradual
or even sudden return to authoritarian structures. Corruption
both in government and private business has no little role in dis-
crediting freshly installed democratic procedures and freshly in-
stalled free market systems.
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Corruption is more than a moral issue. Corruption contra-
dicts the very notion of one person-one vote democratic govern-
ment. It limits the efficiency of competition and creates social
injustice, if not misery. Corruption should therefore be elimi-
nated with a sense of urgency.
II. FIGHTING CORRUPTION FROM WITHOUT
There is corruption in every state of the world. In most
states, it can be fought from within, with the press and the judici-
ary as the primary agents of internal control. Journalists, prose-
cutors, and judges, however, are not totally immune to corrup-
tion either. Cases of improper conduct are regrettable but of no
general harm as long as there remains some newspaper, televi-
sion station, or court that can be relied upon to take up an inci-
dent of corrupt practices. By contrast, a situation where no one
in the media or judiciary cares, or dares, to put forward even
meticulously documented cases of corruption is quite alarming,
no matter whether the situation results from the pervasiveness of
corruption, an atmosphere of personal threats, or both. The
deep involvement of members of the political class in Italy, only
recently revealed thanks to judges and public prosecutors, gives
an idea of what the situation could be like.
It is actually for the sociologist, however, to propose meth-
ods to overcome indifference and immobility in a society. Lack-
ing such training, this author confines himself to submitting
some legal observations on how to make use of the foreign ele-
ment of corruption in the fight against it.
To be sure, it is common to leave front-line activities, such
as arranging for the bribery itself and effectuating payments, to
nationals of the state where it takes place. Given the amount of
cross-border trade and investment, however, the more substan-
tial corruption cases usually include links to foreign states. For-
eign hard currency often provides the strongest incentive for
bribes. Non-domestic firms that use bribery to obtain orders, or
the approval of investment projects including tax holidays, usu-
ally keep a detailed record of successful and unsuccessful busi-
ness operations of that kind. After all, in Germany and most
other states such "useful expenditures" are tax deductible.
Double invoicing of foreign trade, moreover, might prescribe
payment to be made to accounts held with foreign banks. Occa-
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sionally, international arbitral tribunals or foreign courts may be
confronted with cases requiring a ruling on the validity of con-
tracts that we'e obtained by means of placing bribes.
Concerns of foreign states have so far focused on follow-up
crimes, for instance, on tax evasion where commissions received
remain undeclared. The corrupt scheme itself has been given a
blind eye. The underlying sentiment appears to be one of shrug-
ging the shoulders regarding the conditions of the country
where bribery seems a way of life. It is taken for "Realpolitik" to
content oneself with the mercantilist argument that if domestic
companies were prevented from offering bribes, competitors
from another state would have paid the bribe and obtained the
order.
It may be wondered how long tax-payers in the parent states
will continue to tolerate such a state of affairs. For it is the tax-
payers as a whole who must compensate for the loss of revenues
resulting from bribery induced tax deductions. It is also for the
tax-payers to finance the regular bail-outs for defaults of public
and private debts incurred in the states where corruption occurs.
Additionally, the taxpayers suffer the loss of efficiency if con-
tracts are awarded to the bidder offering the highest bribe. If
there is ever a backlash towards authoritarian regimes, it will be
for the tax-payers to bear the burden of financing additional ex-
penditures on national security.
There should be no lack of motive for fighting corruption
across the border. But is it legally permitted to look after cor-
ruption in other states? And, if so, how should it be done? It is
at these points that international law comes into play.
III. THE INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVE
A. The Jurisdictional Problem
Combatting corruption across the border raises a problem
of state jurisdiction under international law. If corruption takes
place within a country, especially if it involves the bribing of offi-
cials of that country, it is first and foremost the task of that coun-
try to deal with the matter. Jurisdiction of one country, however,
does not necessarily bar another country from having jurisdic-
tion too. The traditional test of general international law would
be to examine (1) whether there is a sufficient link to the other
country and (2) whether such additional exercise of jurisdiction
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could be considered an illicit interference with the exercise, or,
to put it more accurately, the deliberate "non-exercise" of juris-
diction by the first country:
(1) The nationality of a person involved in the bribery or the
nationality of the employer company may provide the
necessary connecting factors. Should, however, cases ac-
tually be taken up on the basis of links of nationality,
bribery techniques are likely to be remodeled so as to es-
cape the application of the law of states capable and will-
ing to exercise jurisdiction. Enforcement would then de-
pend on whether the effects principle or some principle
of universality is considered tojustify the coverage of for-
eign bribery by domestic law.
(2) The exercise ofjurisdiction could be considered intrusive
whenever a state promotes bribery, for instance, as a
scheme of remunerating its public employees. An offi-
cial policy to that effect will be hard to establish. At most
states could be found to differ with regard to the more
marginal issues of corruption, such as supporting polit-
ical parties in exchange for favorable treatment. In cases
of that kind, a country exercising jurisdiction under its
stricter laws could be obliged to adapt the terms of reme-
dies to the more favorable treatment accorded by the ter-
ritorially applicable law.
On the whole, the jurisdictional issue should not be overem-
phasized. It will become moot as soon as treaty law permits and
indeed prescribes the pursuit of corruption cases in states other
than the one where the corruption took place. The conclusion
of a convention on foreign corrupt practices seems indispensa-
ble. Present practice shows that states are not prepared to volun-
teer prosecution of foreign corruption cases against their own
companies as long as they have reason to fear that competitors
will take advantage of the situation to increase market share in
the state where corruption exists.
B. Taking Up Previous Efforts
The need for international action against corruption may
never have been more acute than today. This is not to say that
such need has not been felt before, nor that international action
has never before been advocated. In fact, the U.N. General As-
sembly recommended action back in 1975. The International
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Chamber of Commerce followed soon after, as did the Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development. In view of
the problems surfacing in Eastern Europe, both the Council of
Europe and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development recently placed the fight against corruption on
their agenda.
There may be more organizations that have advocated do-
ing something about the problem. So far, however, efforts have
nowhere passed beyond the stage of mutual encouragement or,
technically speaking, of soft law recommendations. In the case
of fighting corruption across borders, unlike other cases, this is
not enough. Mere recommendations are bound to be abortive.
The reason is simple: states that follow a recommendation can
never be certain that others will do so as well.
C. Towards an International Convention on Foreign Corrupt
Practices
If a distortion of competition among states eager to support
the export and foreign investment of their multinational compa-
nies is to be avoided, the conclusion of a convention points to
the only effective solution. For the same reason, such a conven-
tion should enter into force only after it has been ratified by all
of the major nations involved in world trade and foreign invest-
ment. Furthermore, the remedies provided for by the conven-
tion should not depend on whether or not particular con-
tracting states decide to proceed to enforcement. It should
therefore be considered to put enforcement into the hands of
interested private parties.
In contrast to numerous projects of international conven-
tions where effectiveness was successfully upgraded step by step,
a project dealing with corruption has to warrant the utmost ef-
fectiveness right away. Otherwise, it will not be accepted for fear
that the proceeds of foreign trade and investment will be shifted
to competitors that stick with today's cavalier approach to for-
eign corruption.
The contents of a convention on fighting corruption across
borders will certainly require careful discussion. A few propos-
als, most of them inspired by forerunners in U.S. law, must suf-
fice:
(1) The double standard of fighting corruption domestically
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and offering benign neglect to corruption abroad must
be terminated. It is for criminal law to define standards
by expanding its coverage so as to include foreign related
cases. In addition, tax law must stop creating incentives
to promote business through corrupt practices.
(2) Enforcement must be privatized by offering competitors
an action for damages or, better still, treble damages
upon proving injury because a competitor obtained a
contract through the use of corrupt practices. Criminal
prosecution of cross-border cases would be costly and
could be resented because it would not be directed
against the primary culprits who could safely continue
the activities abroad.
(3) Discovery and evidence must take a step forward by using
modern technology. Computer technology recording
each transaction within a global operation generally ex-
ists. The procedural laws giving access to documentation
of that kind, strictly supervised by the courts, have yet to
follow.
CONCLUSION
Referring to a First, Second, and Third World makes less
sense today than it did five years ago. The common ground of
shared purposes has expanded so as to make the world merge
gradually into one world with most states subscribing, in princi-
ple at least, to democratic standards and to a market system of
economy. Taking up the fight against cross-border corruption
would contribute substantially to sustaining and promoting that
development. The public, regularly annoyed by front-page news
revealing corrupt practices, has become sensitive to the problem
in general. Not many people, however, are aware of the fact that
foreign corruption cuts into their personal budget. All the
same, it will take some resolve to go ahead and proceed with the
drafting, signing, and ratifying of a convention on foreign cor-
rupt practices. Such a convention, which serves democracy and
market economy alike, would highlight the one-world character
of international law in the next century.
